

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

DC/SR/RISB/P
1052 J, x-3339

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. C/SR/RISB/P		3/6/61		
2. C/SR/RISB		6 MAR 1961		
3. SR/MC			9 1961	
4. C/SR/6 SR/COP	8 MAR 1961 20 MAR 1961	9 MAR 1961	17 MAR 1961	
5. C/SR/2	21 MAR 1961			
6. C/SR/3		22 MAR	22 MAR	
7. C/SR/4		22 MAR 1961		
8. SECRET				
9. C/SR/9	23 MAR 1961		23 MAR	
10. C/SR/10		24 MAR 1961	24 MAR	
11. CI/OG			29	
12. EE/OPS/CI	2616 H			
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14. SECRET	5 - APR 1961		6 - APR 1961	
15. AF/C/PI		6 APR 1961		
16. C/WE/PI		6 APR 1961	6 - APR 1961	
17. C/WE/PI SR/COP	10 Apr Please sign	10		
18. C/SR			17 APR	

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BD 2396
Book Dispatch No. 2396

74-120-64	
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 6 MAR 1961	

SECRET

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13-19-Pls direct E
As add 1 C, FE/Exec
X 14gs distribution.
Pls. charge field list to
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COORDINATING OFFICERS

4. SR/RISB/P			
5. SR/MC		18 APR 1961	18 APR 1961
6. RID/DP		19/4	
7. RID/ME			
8. RID/DP SR/RISB/P	1307L		

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Please correct patronymic to
Yasliyerich

OK to pouch to NE Stations listed
per telephone conversation with
etc. RID/DP
19/4/61

SECRET

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. Book Dispatch No. 2396	
TO INFO Chiefs of Certain Stations and Bases		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <i>6 Nov 1961</i>		
FROM Chief, SR		DATE		
SUBJECT Operational/REDCAP/LCIMPROVE o Acquisition and Reporting of Information on Soviet Students Abroad		RE: "43-3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE)		
ACTION REQUIRED		☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING		
		☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY		
REFERENCE(S)				
1. One category of Soviet national residing outside the Soviet Union for an extended period of time which has not, in all areas, been afforded the same degree of interest and coverage as <u>REDCAP targets</u> is the Soviet citizen studying abroad. As a result of this relative lack of attention, it is felt that we are missing an opportunity to learn more about Soviet use of such students for intelligence purposes, as well as a chance to have more than usual access to a Soviet outside of an official Soviet installation for more than a very short period of time, in order to weigh any recruitment possibilities. 2. The purpose of this dispatch is to emphasize that the acquisition of information on Soviet students in your respective areas is considered an integral part of the REDCAP program and consequently complete and continuous reporting of such data is expected as a matter of routine procedure. This type of information is processed at Headquarters in much the same manner as that received on REDCAP personalities and procedures for providing the field with Headquarters traces and REDCAP notebook sheets are the same. 3. The interest in Soviet students abroad, as mentioned in paragraph 1 above, is twofold. Information from several areas indicates that certain Soviet students abroad are actively engaged in espionage activities for the Soviet Intelligence Services. Some are RIS staff officers who are members of local residencies, others act as spotters and assessors of potential agents for the RIS. (As you are aware, a priority RIS target, the American student abroad, is one generally well within easy reach of the Soviet student abroad.) In addition, there is some evidence that Soviet intelligence trainees preparing for assignments to illegal as well as legal residencies are sent abroad to pose as students, not so much for the formal education they receive at foreign universities as to increase their language proficiency and acquire area knowledge. One case of recent origin which graphically illustrates the use by the RIS of Soviet students abroad concerns the Soviet national Petr Vasilyevich SMIRNOV who was enrolled at the Institute for Social Studies in The Hague, The Netherlands, during 1959 and 1960. From August 1959 until his agent's arrest in May 1960, SMIRNOV served as RIS case officer for an agent originally recruited by the East German Security Service (MfS) and turned over to the Soviets, apparently for the specific purpose of attempting to penetrate the Netherlands Security Service. SMIRNOV may have been sent to The Netherlands specifically to handle operations of this nature. On the other hand he may only have been intended to act as a "spotter" among students at the institute but was given this assignment on an ad hoc basis because the RIS felt the operation warranted a higher degree of security than would have been achieved had it been handled by members of the legal rezidentura assigned to the local Soviet Embassy. 4. There is also an interest in exploring the possibilities for making recruitment approaches to these Soviet students abroad. Though undoubtedly hand-picked for their political reliability, these students, once exposed for an extended period of time to a segment of the Western world, may well experience varying degrees of doubts about the Soviet system which might make them susceptible to a recruitment approach. Unlike their countrymen who are stationed abroad in an official installation, in many cases the Soviet student would perforce come into close and continuous contact with Western peoples and ways and thus would be subjected to influences of a greater variety and intensity than would the Soviet official.				
CS COPY <i>74-120-64</i>				
FORM 10-57 53b (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

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